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ABSTRACT 
 
Shell and tube heat exchangers are used extensively in the process industry; they are a 
part of every process and make up for significant part of the capital cost investment. Due to high 
number of heat exchangers present in plant, their frequent failure is also a continuous problem. 
The heat exchanger failures can lead to lower production, unplanned shutdown and in some 
cases injury or loss of life. Insufficient safety analysis and lack of risk assessment followed by 
inherent safety considerations in the initial phases of design are the primary reason behind 
frequent failure of these exchangers. Investigations of previous incidents indicate that the failures 
could have been avoided, if appropriate safety assessment of the equipment was carried out in 
the basic engineering phase.  
This study focuses on underlying reason behind frequent failure of shell & tube heat 
exchangers and develops a methodology for inherent safety quantification of these exchangers in 
early design stage. The current practice is to use QRA for safety assessment of heat exchangers, 
which can only be done at later stages in project development, and by this time the opportunity to 
implement inherent safety principles is minimum and expensive. In this work, an index has been 
developed which incorporates the safety aspect of metallurgy selected and possible interaction 
between the material of construction and selected process chemical. Additionally, a framework 
has been proposed which provides systematic evaluation method for equipment safety along with 
process safety in the basic design phase of the project.  
The developed methodology was applied to a fire and explosion which occurred at 
Tesoro’s, Anacortes refinery due to catastrophic rupture of heat exchanger and resulted in seven 
fatalities.  
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An important conclusion that can be drawn from this work is that inherent safety 
principles can be applied to metallurgy selection process of equipment, which is typically during 
pre-design and basic engineering phase of the project.  Then utilizing the information available 
inherent safety level assessment of both process and equipment can be carried out in the early 
design stage. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Heat exchangers are extensively used in process industries, in the form of cooler, heater, 
condenser, evaporator, boiler, etc. They contribute towards a big part of capital investment 
during the initial stages and operating expenditure throughout the life cycle. Heat 
integration/optimization to reduce energy consumption is the constant focus of the industries. 
Heat Exchangers Networks (HEN) is well-known concept to achieve this minimization of energy 
consumption. Pinch Analysis (PA) is a well-researched methodology that provides options 
maximizing heat recovery and minimizing heating and cooling requirements, while 
simultaneously minimizing the number of heat exchangers. However, while PA has become a 
significant tool in achieving energy saving, safety aspect of the final HEN is rarely incorporated 
during the HEN design phase and additional engineering/managerial controls are later added as 
required using the conventional method, e.g. through HAZOP, which can increase the overall 
cost significantly. In addition, heat integration brings different process streams together for 
energy optimization, and while selecting hot and cold streams during HEN design, if due 
consideration is not provided to safety aspect of the HEN, in terms of both – compatibility of 
shell side and tube side process fluid, and metallurgy suitability for different process fluids, it 
can introduce additional operation hazards which would necessitate further investment on add-on 
safety features.  
The most common safety issues associated with HE design are possibility of 
contamination, leakage, reaction between shell and tube fluid leading to runaway reaction or in 
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extreme cases explosion, selection of inappropriate material of construction leading to 
mechanical failure. Including equipment safety along with process safety in the initial phase of 
design can reduce these risks significantly and thus will reduce the requirement of additional 
safety features, thus making the design inherently safer. 
Inherently Safer Design (ISD) is a concept that provides a way to enhance process safety 
by introducing fundamentally safer characteristics into the development of a process. This 
concept can be applied at various stages in the life cycle of a plant – from early process invention 
and research through development, plant design, operation, to eventual shutdown and 
demolition. The concept of Inherently Safer Design was first introduced by Dr Trevor Kletz in 
1978 in an article “What you don’t have, can’t leak” in the 19th Loss prevention symposium of 
the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, based on lessons learnt from Flixborough disaster 
(Kletz, 1978). The fundamental concept behind ISD is making process safer by “inherent” nature 
of the process and not by initially accepting hazards and then then relying on added on safety 
features as followed in conventional methods.  
The aim of this study is to propose an index/framework which can be utilized during the 
design of Shell & Tube Heat Exchanger (STHE) and also for development of HEN which are 
inherently safer. The literature review which was carried out while developing this framework, 
application of the methodology to case studies, results obtained and subsequent analysis, 
followed by conclusions and future work are described in the following chapters. 
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1.2 Motivation 
Shell and Tube Heat Exchangers (STHE) are extensively used in various processes. The 
continuous demand for cost minimization and energy optimization results presence of significant 
number of Heat Exchanger Networks (HEN) across the site. Unfortunately the failure of these 
STHE are also frequently observed, these failures can lead to toxic chemical releases to 
atmosphere, fire and in extreme cases explosions which then results in unfavorable and 
sometimes catastrophic consequences like production loss, plant damage, injuries and fatalities. 
 
The largest fatal incident in US petroleum refinery since BP Texas city incident in 2005, 
was the catastrophic explosion that occurred at the Naphtha Hydrotreater Plant of Tesoro 
Anacortes refinery in April, 2010. This incident claimed seven lives and the investigation report 
led by CSB revealed that the incident could have been avoided by modifying the convention 
design of STHE using ISD principles. (CSB, 2014)  
1.3 Inherently Safer Design 
 Inherent Safety is the design philosophy primarily based on reduction and elimination of 
hazards. (Mannan, 2002)  
The fundamental principles of Inherently Safer Design (ISD) can be described as follows: 
• Substitution: substitute a hazardous chemical in the process with a safer alternative. 
Hazards associated with a chemical can be described by using flammability potential, 
reactivity, toxicity and explosiveness 
• Minimization / Intensification: use the smallest quantity of hazardous materials feasible 
for the process, reduce the size of equipment operating under hazardous conditions, such 
as high temperature or pressure 
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• Attenuation or moderation: reduce hazards by dilution, refrigeration, process alternatives 
that operate at less-hazardous conditions; reduce the potential impact of an accident by 
siting hazardous facilities remotely from people and other property 
• Simplification: eliminate unnecessary complexity, design simpler plants. 
1.4  Application of Inherent Safety Principles – Current Status 
The concept of inherent safety principles is deep rooted within various regulations and 
recommended practice guidelines issued by authoritative bodies like EPA (Environmental 
Protection Agency), CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety), AIChe (American Institute of 
Chemical Engineers), NSC (National Safety Council) and ACS (American Chemical Society).  
There has been significant effort from major corporations as well to promote the 
development of inherently safer chemical processes and products (Khan & Amyotte, 2003). Dow 
developed Dow F&EI and Dow Chemical Exposure Index as relative risk ranking tool utilizing 
inherent safety principles. Exxon Chemical review process is based on life cycle approach (Khan 
& Amyotte, 2003). Rohm and Haas developed Major Accident Prevention Program which is a 
four-step process and works on the principal of consequence analysis for credible events and 
checklists for reduction of hazards. (Renshaw, 1990)  
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2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN OF HEAT 
EXCHANGERS  
 
2.1 Indices for Inherently Safer Process Design 
 Significant research has been done to integrate the inherent safety philosophy in the 
design phase of a process. Several safety indices and assessment methods have been developed 
to understand the potential hazards associated with various process alternatives available during 
the design phase, since the since the conceptualization of ISD by Dr Trevor Kletz in 1978.  
 Prototype Index of Inherent Safety (PIIS) by (Edwards & Lawrence, 1993) was the first 
index published for evaluating inherent safety of a process. This index only considers the 
reactions steps and raw material used. PIIS is calculated as a sum of process score and chemical 
score. The sub-indices for chemical score are toxicity, flammability, explosiveness and 
inventory; the sub-indices for process score are temperature, pressure and yield. (Rahman, 
Heikkilä, & Hurme, 2005).  
 Dow F&E index and Mond index developed by Dow, and latest revision published in 
1994, is one of the many safety indices developed to quantify and assess hazards associated with 
a process. These indices primarily consider fire and explosion hazards and are widely accepted 
and used in the industry for hazard identification at plant level. They have undergone subsequent 
revisions to be a reliable indicator of fire and explosion hazards. But limitation of data 
availability at conceptual stage and various types of hazards present at a plant, apart from fire 
and explosion, (e.g. toxicity, runaway reactions, decomposition, equipment health/reliability 
etc.), indicated and motivated the need for more research towards quantifying safety 
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considerations and thus development of many other safety indices which can be applied at much 
earlier stages of process design.  
Inherent safety index (ISI) developed by (Heikkilä, 1999) provides a much simpler 
calculation technique for ISL assessment, with information available during predesign stage. 
This index takes into account much larger scope of process steps – it includes evaluation of 12 
parameters, most of which can be estimated by using the physical and chemical properties of the 
material being used and operating conditions. An additional sub-index allows inclusion of 
experience based evaluation of process structure. This index also includes equipment safety sub-
index apart from the other general process safety sub-indices. The overall ISI is calculated as 
summation of inherent chemical safety index and inherent process safety index. 
i-safe index developed by (Palaniappan, Srinivasan, & Tan, 2002) uses sub-indices from 
ISI and PIIS and additional NFPA reactivity rating in the Individual Chemical Index (ICI). In 
this method process route is compared based on Overall Safety Index (OSI) which is calculated 
by Overall Chemical Index (OCI) and Overall Reaction Index (ORI), in addition it provides three 
more indices – Worst Chemical Index (WCI), Total Chemical Index (TCI) and Worst Reaction 
Index (WRI). These additional sub-indices are used for process evaluation when two process 
routes have similar OSI. An automated tool was also developed as part of this which helps in 
inherently safer route selection and flowsheet development.  
Another significant improvement towards quantification of inherent safety was 
development of inherent safety index based on fuzzy logic by (Gentile, Rogers, & Mannan, 
2003). This method attempts to address the subjective nature of information used in ISI method. 
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Safety Weighted Hazard Index (SWeHI) was developed by combining process hazards 
and available safety measures in the final hazard assessment score to provide an overview of the 
plant safety level. (Khan, Hussain, & Abbasi, 2001) 
One of the latest indices for inherent safety assessment is Process Stream Index (PSI) 
which is utilized once a chemical process route has been selected and considers the process 
stream as a mixture and not individual component, as is generally the case with other published 
indices. This method uses relative ranking of a process stream against others streams in the 
process route and represents the inherent safety level, from the perspective of explosion, of 
process streams during simulation work. (Chan, Alwi, Hassim, Manan, & Klemeš, 2014) 
Table 1 describes the information which is utilized in all the different indices that was 
explained in this section. 
  
 8 
 
Safety Index Requirements 
Dow F&EI reactivity, flammability or combustion potential, heat of combustion, 
reaction – endothermic/exothermic, toxicity, corrosion/erosion, plot 
plan, process flow sheet, pressure, temperature, leakage around joints & 
packing, inventory, emergency equipment access 
Mond Index reactivity, ignition sensitivity, spontaneous heating & polymerization, 
toxicity, explosiveness, physical changes, material transfer & handling, 
process conditions, layout spacing 
PIIS flammability, explosiveness, toxicity, inventory, temperature, pressure, 
yield 
ISI Heat of reaction – main reaction/side reaction, chemical interaction – 
with air/water/other process chemical/MOC, flammability, 
explosiveness, toxicity, corrosivity, inventory, temperature, pressure, 
equipment, process structure 
i-safe Flammability, toxicity, explosiveness, NFPA reactivity rating, 
temperature, pressure, yield, heat of reaction 
PRI stream composition – not pure component, density, pressure, energy, 
combustibility 
Table 1 Input requirement for various safety indices calculation. Adapted from Rahman, 
Heikkilä, & Hurme, 2005 
 
In 2005, a benchmarking study was carried out by (Rahman, Heikkilä, & Hurme, 2005) 
for the three most accepted inherent safety indices – PIIS, i-safe and ISI, using the methyl 
methacrylate process and the outcome was compared against expert judgment. Depending on the 
index used there was a difference of 10-15% in subprocess evaluations from expert values. For 
process route evaluation, the difference was about 4 to 10% from expert opinion, based on the 
safety index used. The comparison study noted that ISI is the most elaborate and accurate when 
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compared with expert values. These results also help in concluding that safety indices can be 
successfully utilized for process route evaluations with reasonable accuracy. (Leong & Shariff, 
2009). A review of development of various safety indices with emphasis on application in design 
phase of a project is well covered by (Roy, et al., 2016).  
2.2 Safety Analysis at Different Design Phases 
Dr Kletz had stated that implementing inherent safety principles becomes more and more 
difficult as the design of the process plant progresses. This is due to the absence of information at 
preliminary design stages which complicates safety considerations. As the process design 
develops, more information is made available however carrying out safety analysis in later 
phases of design, limits the option of making process inherently safer and safety is achieved by 
means of add-on engineering protection and management protection techniques. This 
phenomenon referred to as design paradox by (Hurme & Rahman, 2005) is illustrated in figure 1.  
  
Figure 1 Design paradox and ISD. Adapted from Hurme & Rahman, 2005 
 
Different evaluation techniques appropriate during different stages of process design, 
based on the information available is described in table 2. 
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Design stage Information available Evaluation technique 
Process R&D physical and chemical properties of the 
selected raw material, chemical reactions and 
interactions, thermodynamics, preliminary 
process concept 
Laboratory 
screening and testing 
Predesign mass balance, energy balance, process concept, 
operating conditions, preliminary layout sketch 
ISI, PIIS, i-safe, PRI 
Basic 
engineering 
process data on equipment, piping and 
instruments, procedures – normal 
operation/start-up/shut-down, preliminary 
layout 
Dow F&E Index, 
Mond index, PSI, 
ESI 
Detailed 
engineering 
detailed engineering data for equipment, 
piping, instruments, controls, electricals, 
constructions, structure, layout of the plant 
Dow F&EI, Mond 
index 
Construction vendor data for equipments, as built data What-if, Checklist 
Start-up process performance data, commissioning data What-if, Checklist 
Operation operation data and experience Dow F&EI, Mond 
index,  
Table 2 Inherent safety evaluation techniques at different process design stages. Adapted 
from Heikkilä, 1999 
 
Though the idea of ISD had been initiated a long time ago, it was not successfully 
integrated with basic engineering stage due to lack of systematic methodology (Jha, Pasha, & 
Zaini, 2016). A significant contribution towards integration of ISD principle in basic 
engineering/simulation stage was the development of systematic approach framework – Two-tier 
inherent safety index (2TISI) shown in figure 2. (Leong & Shariff, 2009). The aim of this 
framework is to first select inherently safer process chemical route by using Process Route Index 
(PRI), the second step is to carryout Inherent Risk Assessment (IRA) to analyze consequent 
impact and frequency of credible event (explosion) for the selected process route. If the risk is 
found unacceptable, further inherent safety level (ISL) assessment of process streams is carried 
out by using Process Stream Index (PSI) (Shariff, Leong, & Zaini, 2012) at the preliminary 
design stage.  Inherent Risk Assessment (IRA) concept introduced by (Shariff & Leong, 2009) 
and utilized in this framework takes the structured approach of QRA and implements them at 
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early phases of design to enable the assessment, control and reduction of risk using the principles 
of inherent safety and safety indices. 
 
Figure 2 Framework of two-tier inherent safety index (2TISI). Adapted from Leong & 
Shariff, 2009 
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2.3 Common Causes of Heat Exchanger Failure 
Lack of inherently safer design considerations combined with inadequate mechanical 
safety analysis are one of the most common causes associated with failure of STHE. Failure of 
STHE can be caused by several factors e.g., corrosion, mechanical vibrations, design faults, 
fabrication issues, inappropriate material of construction, flow and heat transfer related issues. 
As the failure can be combined outcome of several variables, it becomes difficult to carry out 
assessment of some of these failures during early design stage. Flow, thermal instabilities and 
inappropriate metallurgy are frequently reported as causal factor of STHE failures. Flow and 
thermal instabilities are generally associated with process variables like – pressure, temperature 
and flow velocity. To estimate flow velocity during preliminary design stage is difficult as it 
requires actual configuration of STHE, however pressure, temperature and combustibility 
potential values are available during preliminary design stage. Corrected mean temperature 
difference can be easily estimated using simulation. Using this information explosion potential 
and consequence of such explosion can be estimated during preliminary design stage.  (Pasha, 
2017).   
A database study carried out in 2013, to identify and categorize the reasons behind 
chemical process industry accidents based on equipments. 364 incidents from the Japanese 
Failure Knowledge Database were studied. This study showed heat transfer equipments are the 
third most common cause behind incidents. Overall heat transfer equipments account for on 
average 8% of the chemical process incidents, 4% of these incidents are due to heat exchanger 
failures. Further detailed analysis behind the failure of heat transfer equipments indicates process 
contamination, wrong metallurgy selection and corrosion as few of the common causes. (Kidam 
& Hurme, 2013)  
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2.4 Heat Exchanger Network Design and Inherent Safety 
Typically safety aspect for a HEN is considered when HAZOP is conducted on a 
completed HEN design, which results in add-on safety measures and increase in investment. 
There has been growing interest and some significant progress done in HEN design considering 
inherent safety. A methodology integrating the ISI with the STEP graphical approach to achieve 
an inherently safer HEN design is discussed in (Chan, Alwi, Hassim, Manan, & Klemeš, 2014). 
This method constructs the STEP by matching the hot and cold stream based on the ISI value of 
the stream, in place of utilizing conventional FCp values. High ISI value hot stream is matched 
with high ISI cold stream, thus reducing the distribution of hazard throughout HEN and thus 
reduces the total area of hazard. 
Another Pinch Analysis based safety assessment technique for optimal HEN design was 
proposed by (Hafizan, Alwi, Mannan, & Klemes, 2016), this method modifies the ISI based 
stream matching proposed by (Chan, Alwi, Hassim, Manan, & Klemeš, 2014) and extends it 
further to include operability of HEN – in terms of flexibility and controllability of HEN, while 
considering inherent safety.   
Most recent study on inherently safer design of HEN was proposed by (Pasha, 2017), in 
this technique new safety indices are developed for assessing inherent safety level of individual 
heat exchangers and an overall safety index for HEN. This index considers pressure, CMTD, 
heating value and combustibility potential of the stream. Risk assessment in the event of 
explosion is then carried out, using IRA method and if found outside the defined acceptable 
range, inherent safety principles are applied to modify the network design. The developed 
methodology is also linked with process simulation tool HYSYS for ease of data transfer and 
assessment. 
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2.5 QRA vs IRA 
A conventional QRA is typically carried out during later phase of design, when plant 
design has been completed. At this late stage in design opportunities to include inherent safety 
design principles is very low and could increase the cost considerably. Also important to 
consider is that QRA requires an estimated duration of anywhere between 40 and 1500 
manhours, depending on the level of detail. Owing to this extensive nature QRA generally covers 
few selected cases and very specific elements of the aspects involved in the overall safety of the 
plant. (Shariff & Leong, 2009). The output of both QRA and IRA is judged based on the FN 
curve. In case of QRA a 3-region FN curve is used, while for IRA this has been modified to 2-
region FN curve. The “tolerable if ALARP” and “tolerable” division of QRA is merged to one 
division of “tolerable”. This is to account for unavailability of safety measures and control 
mechanisms data during pre-design stage of a project, which are required to estimate and reduce 
risk to ALARP. (Shariff & Leong, 2009). Typical FN curves which are used for QRA and IRA 
methods are shown in figure 3 & 4.  
 
Figure 3 3-region FN curve – QRA. Adapted from Shariff & Leong, 2009 
 15 
 
 
Figure 4 2-region FN curve – IRA. Adapted from Shariff & Leong, 2009 
 
Table 3 describes the comparison between QRA and IRA. 
Criteria QRA IRA 
Implementation stage after completion of detailed 
design 
preliminary design / 
simulation stage 
Purpose to demonstrate or prove 
“safety case” as required by 
regulatory agencies 
to proactively identify risk 
inherent to the design and 
guide its reduction by 
implementing inherent safety 
principles 
Regulatory requirements required by regulatory 
agencies 
no regulatory requirement 
Information required Process & Instrumentation 
diagram (P&ID), detailed 
historical weather data 
simulation data and predicted 
piping and equipment sizing 
Scenario few credible scenario studied 
in detail 
basic scenario, such as 
equipment leak 
Duration of analysis ranging from 40 to 1500 
manhours 
relatively quick, carried out 
parallel to simulation work  
Representation of result 3-region FN curve 2-region FN curve 
Table 3 Comparison between QRA & IRA. Adapted from Shariff & Leong, 2009 
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2.6 Limitations of Current Research 
 Literature review of various ISL techniques which are available shows that there are 
multiple safety assessment indices developed which accounts for various process factors like 
toxicity, flammability, reactivity, explosiveness, temperature, pressure to name a few. However, 
there are hardly any indices available and attention given on equipment safety – equipments like 
heat exchangers can also be made inherently safer mechanically, by using ISD principles, during 
the basic engineering phase of design. ISI is the only pioneered safety index which places focus 
on equipment safety, in initial design phase of a project. ISI defines equipment by using two 
parameters – chemical interaction with other chemical & MOC, and type of equipment. 
Chemical interaction is a sub-index for reaction hazards and type of equipment is sub-index for 
process hazards. In this method of quantifying equipment safety, using the technique of type of 
equipment – all the heat exchangers or reactors or compressors receive the same level of inherent 
safety, irrespective of the MOC or operating conditions. Thus, this method is not very helpful in 
determining safety level of standalone equipment, once the process route has been finalized. 
Also, the chemical interaction parameter is a subindex of reaction hazards, along with six more 
parameters quantifying reaction hazards. As a result, the negative effect of one parameter can 
cancel the positive of another and can lower the value of overall subindex. Thus, it is needed to 
evaluate equipment safety as a separate subindex in process and taking into consideration the 
operating conditions of the equipment, MOC and not only relying on type of equipment. 
The research area of inherently safer HEN design has mostly been concentrated on 
improvement of HEN design by analyzing sub-indices which are defined by process chemical 
properties and operating conditions. The possible interaction of selected chemical or the 
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operating conditions with MOC of the heat exchanger which can result in mechanical failure of 
the equipment is not considered. There are numerous methods available to perform hazard 
assessment of STHE in the later phases of project design, but there is very limited research done 
on application and validation of safety indices on heat exchangers and heat exchanger networks 
which considers both process and mechanical safety aspects of the equipment and which can be 
utilized in early phases of design. 
This study aims to include learnings from historical incidents/performances into 
equipment safety at basic engineering/simulation stage of project design. The intent is that once 
the inherently safer process route has been selected; ask the question ‘is there an alternative to 
make the equipment inherently safe? Are there inherently safer metallurgy available for the 
subject chemical?’ – And include the outcome as part of safety assessment carried out during 
initial stages of design. Information regarding material of construction (MOC) of major 
equipments is generally available during basic engineering phase and if ISL assessment of 
suitability of MOC for given chemical and operating conditions is incorporated in initial safety 
considerations along with analysis of PSI, it would help in avoiding incidents due to 
inappropriate metallurgy selection, which is a significant cause behind the failure of a number of 
heat exchanger.   
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3. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
 
This section describes the developed method for safety assessment of heat exchanger, in 
the design/simulation stage of any project, which is divided in three parts. First accumulate data 
on past heat exchanger incidents and analyze causal factors of these incidents to determine if 
sufficient information about the defining variable is available during the preliminary design stage 
to carry out safety assessment and implementing ISD alternatives to avoid such incidents. The 
second part is development of a Heat Exchanger Safety Index (HESI) to analyze the risk 
associated with the heat exchangers and then use them to assess the overall risk of heat 
exchanger network using Heat Exchanger Network Overall Safety Index (HENOSI) during 
initial phase of design of a process. The third section of the study utilizes the developed safety 
indices in Two-tier Inherent Safety Index (2TISI) and provides a Modified Inherent Safety 
Framework (MISF), utilizing both PSI and ESI. 
3.1 Past Heat Exchanger Failure Data 
Table 4 summarizes few of many heat exchangers failures that happened in the industry 
and the root cause of the failure identified during the investigation, as can be seen for quite a few 
incidents that sufficient information regarding the root cause variable was available during the 
basic engineering phase of process design and was found during the investigation that some of 
the incidents could have been avoided if inherently safer design principle was applied early-on in 
the design phase. 
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Table 4 Failure Analysis of STHE through various accidents. Adapted from Pasha, 2017 
S. 
No. 
Exchanger Service Failure 
Causes 
Contributing 
variables 
Variable 
defining stage 
Future 
direction 
Referen
ce 
1 Preheat feed gas of 
reactor by outlet 
gas of the same 
reactor in naphtha 
hydrotreating unit 
High 
temperature 
hydrogen 
attack 
(HTHA) 
High 
concentration of 
reactive 
component 
Preliminary 
design stage 
Use 
compatible 
and 
inherently 
safe 
material 
(CSB, 
2014) 
 
Inappropriate 
material 
Basic engineering 
stage 
2 Industrial water at 
shell side and 
cooling water at 
tube side. 
Erosion 
Corrosion 
High 
concentration of 
reactive 
component 
Preliminary 
design stage 
Select 
optimized 
flow 
velocity 
and 
appropriate 
tube 
material 
(Kuznick
a, 2009) 
High flow 
velocity 
Basic engineering 
stage 
Inappropriate 
material of tubes 
Basic engineering 
stage 
3 Cooling water in 
tubes and steam is 
on the shell side 
Flow-
induced 
Erosion 
Low velocity Preliminary 
design stage 
 (Ranjbar, 
2010) 
Inappropriate 
tube material 
Basic engineering 
stage 
4 Flue gas at shell 
side and Boiler 
Feed Water (BFW) 
at tube side. 
Creep attack 
due to 
corrosion 
in the whole 
system 
Tubes 
overheating 
Preliminary 
design stage 
Improved 
design of 
heat 
exchangers 
(Jahromi, 
AliPour, 
& 
Beirami, 
2003) 
Poor water 
treatment 
Operations 
5 Four gas coolers, 
gas is inside of 
tube and seawater 
is on the shell side. 
Crevice 
Corrosion 
Inappropriate 
tube 
Material 
Basic engineering 
stage 
Use 
compatible 
and 
inherently 
safer 
material 
(Allahkar
am, 
Zakersaf
aee, & 
Haghgoo
, 2011) 
6 Process gas in tube 
side while cooling 
water in the shell. 
Stress 
corrosion 
Cracking 
Inappropriate 
material 
of tubes 
Basic engineering 
stage 
Use of 
appropriate 
tubes 
material 
(Esaklul, 
1992) 
7 Process gas at shell 
and BFW at tube 
side 
Thermal 
fatigue 
Excessive 
heating 
Preliminary 
design stage  
Timely 
inspection 
(Usman 
& Khan, 
2008) 
8 Ammonia in the 
shell side and 
process chemical in 
the tube side. 
Over 
Pressurizatio
n 
Pressure Preliminary 
design stage 
Emphasize 
on 
workers 
safety 
training 
(CSB, 
2011) 
 
9 Condensate at 
Tube side and 
Heavy Gas Oil 
(HGO) at the shell. 
Intergranular 
stress 
corrosion 
cracking 
Poor fabrication 
(welding) 
Not applicable Improved 
welding 
process 
(Guo, 
Han, 
Tang, 
Zuo, & 
Lin, 
2011) 
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3.2 Index Calculation 
The Heat Exchanger Safety Index (HESI) is developed using concept similar to 
calculation of Inherent Safety Index (ISI) & Process Stream Index (PSI). The mathematical 
formulation of HESI will take into consideration various factors as mentioned below: 
HESI = f(Pressure, Temperature, flammability, flammable range, metallurgy interaction) 
HESI = f(P, T, FL, FR, M) 
 Pressure, temperature values is with units bar, degC respectively. The conversion of 
individual parameters to dimensionless index and scoring is based on ISI methodology (Heikkilä, 
1999) and is scoring is explained through table 5 to table 8. 
Flammability sub index 
Flash Point (°C) Flammability Score (IF) 
Undefined Nonflammable 0 
Flash point > 55 °C Combustible 1 
Flash point ≤ 55 °C Flammable 2 
Flash point < 21 °C Easily flammable 3 
Flash point < 0 °C Very flammable 4 
Table 5 Flash point conversion 
 
Flammable range for the process fluid can be calculated as follows: 
FR = UFLmix – LFLmix  
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UFLmix = 
1
∑
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
                LFLmix = 
1
∑
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
where,  yi = mole fraction of an individual component in the mixture. 
Flammable range sub index 
Flammable range (UFL-LFL) vol% Score (IFR) 
Non explosive 0 
0 – 20  1 
20 – 45  2 
45 – 70  3 
70 – 100  4 
Table 6 Flammable range conversion 
 
Temperature sub index  
Process temperature (°C)  Score (IT) 
< 0 °C 1 
0 – 70 °C  0 
70 – 150 °C 1 
150 – 300 °C 2 
300 – 600 °C 3 
> 600 °C 4 
Table 7 Temperature conversion 
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Pressure sub index 
Process pressure (bar) Score (IP) 
0.5 – 5 bar 0 
0 – 0.5 or 5 – 25 bar 1 
25 – 50 bar 2 
50 – 200 bar 3 
200 – 1000 bar 4 
Table 8 Pressure conversion 
  
 Metallurgy conversion sub index is developed based on guidelines applicable to a 
chemical process, which takes into consideration learnings from previous incident investigations 
and root cause of failures identified and is shown in table 9. A set of questions are used to 
estimate metallurgy interaction as a dimensionless score, where lower score implies safer 
selection and higher is relatively unsafe. This sub-index gives the opportunity to analyze and 
incorporate the learnings from previous incidents which are not a part of “mandatory 
regulations”, but good engineering practice.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23 
 
Metallurgy interaction sub index 
Process fluid-metallurgy MI 
previous history of exchangers in similar 
service checked 
Yes 0 
No 1 
design improvements and learnings from 
previous incidents included, if applicable 
Yes 0 
No 1 
Corrosion/erosion at selected process 
conditions - velocity/Pressure/Temperature 
acceptable 0 
higher 1 
is there better/inherently safer metallurgy 
available for selected conditions - 
Pressure/Temperature/process fluid 
Yes 1 
No 0 
If yes, for inherently safer metallurgy 
availability - Is the metallurgy selected 
inherently safer, after considering 
consequence analysis 
risk acceptable 0 
risk unacceptable 1 
additional layer/cladding required 
Yes 1 
No 0 
Post-weld heat treatment done 
Yes 0 
No 1 
process fluid can react with MOC resulting 
in pressure/temperature build up/gas 
generation 
Yes 1 
No 0 
MOC susceptible to HTHA/Sulfidatin 
corrosion/embrittlement/stress corrosion 
cracking 
at normal operating 
conditions (include 
safety margin of 55 
deg F and 50 psi) 
2 
at higher/lower 
operating conditions 
±100 degF and 50 psi 
1 
not susceptible 0 
Possibility of contaminants in the process 
fluid which can lead to metal embrittlement/ 
pitting corrosion 
Yes 1 
No 0 
Table 9 Metallurgy interaction conversion 
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The metallurgy sub-index, IM is estimated as per the equation below: 
IM = ∑MI 
Combining these dimensionless numbers gives the inherent safety level of the heat 
exchanger. Higher the value of HESI, indicates lower safety level of the heat exchanger.  
HESI = IF + IFR + IP + IT + IM 
In case of heat exchanger network design, the calculated HESI will be used to estimate 
HENOSI 
HENOSI = ∑HESI 
 The calculated HESI, can be used to relatively rank all the heat exchangers in the network 
and worst heat exchanger can be identified as  
WHESI = max (HESI) 
 The worst heat exchanger is then analyzed further for frequency of a credible event and 
consequence of that event. Loss of containment can lead to fire, explosion or catastrophic rupture 
of the heat exchanger, severity of these events can be estimated using the systematic approach 
defined in (Crowl & Louvar, 1996). Estimation of consequence for the event of process stream 
explosion can be carried out by using iRET tool (Shariff, Rusli, Leong, & V.R. Radhakrishnan, 
2006). iRET tool can also be utilized for estimation of explosion consequences in the event of 
heat exchanger failure, as shown in the study by (Zaini, Pasha, & Kaura, 2016). For estimation of 
frequency of explosion, event tree analysis (ETA) method can be used. A simple framework for 
estimating release outcome frequencies is shown in figure 5. 
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Initial 
release 
Immediate 
ignition? 
Delayed 
ignition? 
Explosion? Outcome 
frequency 
Outcome 
 Yes    Fire 
  No   Environmental 
release 
 No  No  Fire 
  Yes Yes  Explosion 
 
Figure 5 Event tree for calculating release outcome frequencies. Adapted from 
Moosemiller, 2011 
 
 Default frequency of leak from a shell and tube heat exchanger resulting in a rupture can 
be referred from (Moosemiller, 2011). If the risk estimated falls within the acceptable range 
previously defined in IRA step, the heat exchanger and HEN design can be recommended for 
detailed design phase. If the estimated risk for worst case scenario lies outside the tolerable 
range, further modification should be carried out using inherent safety principles. This can be 
achieved by changing HEN flow arrangements, varying operating condition or by changing the 
MOC.  
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3.3 Modified Inherent Safety Framework  
The developed indices are then used as input to MISF in the framework shown in figure 6 
– in the place of ESI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Modified inherent safety framework (MISF) 
Various Process Routes 
Process Route Index (PRI) 
Inherent Risk Assessment (IRA) 
Further 
improve? 
Process Stream Index (PSI) Equipment Safety Index (ESI) 
Estimate Risk 
Proceed with detail design 
Identify Worst Case 
No 
Yes 
Modification using ISD 
principles 
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The inherent safety principles which affect the developed equipment safety sub-index 
(HESI & HENOSI) are explained in figure 7. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Inherent safety principle and HESI 
 
 
Substitution 
Replacing the MOC with 
inherently safer one 
Attenuation 
Reduction in operating 
hazards due to inherently 
safer equipment design 
Lower value of HESI 
and HENOSI 
(inherently safer 
equipment) 
 28 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
  
In this chapter, the proposed safety index and framework for determining inherent safety 
level of STHE and HEN was applied to a case study. The main objective is to show how the 
methodology could be applied in industry.    
4.1 Case Study 
For the purpose of this research, catastrophic rupture of heat exchanger at Tesoro, 
Anacortes refinery in April, 2010 is taken as the case study. This incident is considered the 
largest fatal incident at a US petroleum refinery, since the BP Texas City incident in March, 
2005. (CSB, 2014)  
4.2 Catastrophic Rupture of Heat Exchanger at Tesoro, Anacortes refinery 
On April 2, 2010, the Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company LLC petroleum refinery 
in Anacortes, Washington, experienced a catastrophic rupture of a heat exchanger in the catalytic 
reformer/Naphtha Hydrotreater unit. (CSB, 2014). The heat exchanger was in service for 
handling highly flammable mixture of hydrogen and naphtha, at temperature higher than 500 
degF. The rupture of exchanger resulted in release of the flammable mixture and ignited, causing 
an explosion and fire that continued burning for three hours. This incident fatally injured seven 
employees of Tesoro who were working in the nearby area. (CSB, 2014) Figure 8 shows the 
schematic of exchanger set-up in the unit. 
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Figure 8 Schematic of the Tesoro Anacortes Refinery NHT heat exchanger bank. Adapted 
from CSB, 2014 
 
The NHT unit had two parallel banks of heat exchangers (A/B/C & D/E/F), these 
exchangers were used to pre-heat the reactor feed with reactor effluent. The banks were 
frequently required to be taken out of service and cleaned due to fouling issues. At the time of 
the incident, workers were in the process of putting the A/B/C bank of exchanger back in service, 
after maintenance work was completed, the D/E/F exchanger bank remained in operation during 
this time. While the start-up operation was being performed, the exchanger E catastrophically 
ruptured.  
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4.3 Root Cause for the Exchanger Failure 
The primary cause for the exchanger failure was determined to be High Temperature 
Hydrogen Attack (HTHA). HTHA is a damage mechanism that results in fissures and cracking 
and it occurs when carbon steel equipment is exposed to hydrogen at high temperature and 
pressure. (CSB, 2014) There were several other contributing factors like – failure to identify 
HTHA as a credible even in periodically performed hazard reviews; failure to learn from 
previous near-misses – the heat exchangers had a history of leaks during start-up, for which the 
recommendation was to use steam to mitigate leaks. Possibility of HTHA was identified during 
various PHA that the refinery carried out, however ineffective judgement-based, qualitative 
safeguards were recommended for equipment protection against HTHA and the adequacy of 
these safeguards were never evaluated.   
4.4 Incident Investigation and HTHA Mechanism 
Detailed investigation of the incident was carried out by Chemical Safety Board (CSB). 
The explosion occurred due to weakening of carbon steel metallurgy of the exchanger due to 
HTHA. The refinery was purchased by Tesoro in 1998, it was previously owned by Shell Oil. 
PHA conducted in 1996 by Shell Oil, cited ineffective, qualitative safeguards for protection of 
equipment against HTHA. The PHA revalidations done in 2001 and 2006 by Tesoro, did not 
modify the previous recommendations. PHA carried out in 2010, failed to identify HTHA as a 
credible event for the subject heat exchangers.  
HTHA occurs when atomic hydrogen diffuses into the steel walls of process equipment, 
as shown in figure 9. The hydrogen then reacts with carbon in steel to form methane, this 
reaction is called decarburization. Methane being larger molecule than atomic hydrogen cannot 
diffuse out of the steel. Loss of carbides weakens the steel and accumulation of methane exerts 
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pressure in the vessel wall, creating cavities and fissures which then combine to form 
microcracks and over time go on to form large cracks. HTHA damage is extremely difficult to 
inspect owing to the microscopic and localized nature of the damage, and thus routine inspection 
is not sufficient or reliable enough to ensure mechanical integrity. 
 
Figure 9 Diffusion of atomic Hydrogen through Carbon Steel. Adapted from CSB, 2014 
 
Industry generally relies on API RP 941 Steels for Hydrogen Service at Elevated 
Temperatures and Pressures in Petroleum Refineries and Petrochemical Plants to predict the 
occurrence of HTHA. This document uses Nelson curves for HTHA prediction. Nelson curves, 
developed in 1949 by George Nelson, are empirical and based on data from actual industry 
experience.  
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Figure 10 Carbon Steel Nelson Curve and operating conditions for heat exchanger B/E, 
Tesoro, Anacortes refinery. Adapted from CSB, 2014 
 
Figure 10 shows operating conditions of heat exchanger B/E in comparison with Nelson 
curve. CSB investigation indicated that HTHA damage was present in exchanger B as well, 
though for both the exchangers B & E actual operating condition were modeled to be lower than 
Carbon Steel Nelson curve. Thus, indicating that the industry developed Nelson curve is 
inaccurate and cannot be relied on to prevent HTHA. CSB investigation report mentions that 
they have learned of at least eight other recent refinery incidents where HTHA occurred below 
the carbon steel Nelson curve. (CSB, 2014)   
Nelson curves predict HTHA based on three parameters – process temperature, hydrogen 
partial pressure and MOC. Carbon steel is the lowest curve indicating that it is most susceptible 
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to HTHA. Higher alloyed steel is the inherently safer metallurgy to protect equipment against 
HTHA.  
4.5 Application of the Developed Methodology 
The developed methodology is applied to the NHT feed-effluent heat exchangers of 
Tesoro, Anacortes refinery.  
For flammability and explosiveness calculations stream composition for the inlet and 
outlet of a typical NHT heat exchanger is required, based on the shell side operating pressure of 
~590 psig and CSB estimated hydrogen partial pressure of ~290 psig, it can be easily estimated 
that hydrogen mol% in the stream flowing through heat exchanger B/E was ~50 mol%. For the 
remaining of the heat exchangers in service this composition can be varied directionally with 
temperature variation, the assumed stream composition for shell side (hot fluid) is shown in table 
10. 
 Shell (hot fluid) 
H2 (mol%) Naphtha (mol%) 
A/C 80 20 
B/E 50 50 
D/F 45 55 
Table 10 Vapor composition for typical NHT feed – effluent streams 
 
The naphtha MSDS from Tesoro specifies flash point as ‘-21.7 degC’ (Tesoro), based on 
this information it can be inferred that naphtha-hydrogen mixture will be in ‘very flammable’ 
range. Naphtha LEL and UEL values of 1.2% and 6.9% respectively were taken from Naphtha 
MSDS (Tesoro) and flammability limits of H2 (4 to 76%) were taken from SDS by (Airgas). 
Flammable range for the mixture is estimated in table 11. 
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 LFL (%) UFL (%) Flammable range (%) 
A/C 2.7 25.3 22.6 
B/E 1.8 12.6 10.8 
D/F 1.7 11.7 9.9 
Table 11 Flammable range estimation 
 
The operating conditions and MOC for the series of heat exchangers are provided in table 
12 and the layout with post weld heat treated sections are shown in figure 11. 
 Pressure Temperature MOC 
Bar degC 
A/C 44 132 Mn-0.5Mo steel, clad with 304 stainless steel 
B/E 44 263 Carbon steel, section clad with 316 stainless steel 
(fig.10 ) 
D/F 44 354 Carbon steel 
Table 12 Operating parameters for NHT heat exchangers 
 
 
Figure 11 layout of B/E heat exchanger, Tesoro, Anacortes. Adapted from CSB, 2014 
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 Table 13 below shows index corresponding to individual parameters   
 IP IT IF IEX IM HESI 
A/C 2 1 4 2 4 13 
B/E 2 2 4 1 8 17 
D/F 2 3 4 1 7 17 
Table 13 HESI estimation for the original design 
 
Overall safety index for the network, HENOSI = 47 
Worst heat exchanger, WHESI = B/E and D//F 
4.6 Analysis of Results 
After identifying the worst exchanger of the network, consequence analysis and risk 
estimation should be carried out. If the risk is found unacceptable, individual components of the 
HESI is analyzed to check the potential for improving the inherent safety level of the subject 
exchanger.  
For the selected case study, the biggest contributing factor towards higher HESI is seen 
as IM followed by IT. The inherent safety level of the exchanger can be improved in the selected 
case by reducing the metallurgy sub-index and by optimizing the process conditions. Further 
analyzing the metallurgy sub-index, it can be seen that not implementing learnings from previous 
incidents/design modifications are the primary reason behind higher safety level score. Though 
B/E exchanger operating condition is less severe than D/F, the HESI score for both are same due 
to design issues which can be modified to reduce the score and improve inherent safety level of 
the equipment. B/E heat exchangers were provided with additional 316 stainless steel layer for 
protection against another damage mechanism called sulfidation corrosion (CSB, 2014). The 
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internal layer which was welded to the exchanger resulted in large heat affected zones (HAZ), 
which was not followed up with post-weld heat treatment (PWHT). The created HAZ and non-
PWHT weakened the selected metallurgy further against HTHA. Table 14 shows estimated 
HESI scores with modified metallurgy selection. 
 IP IT IF IEX IM HESI 
A/C 2 1 4 2 3 12 
B/E 2 2 4 1 0 9 
D/F 2 3 4 1 0 10 
Table 14 HESI estimation for modified design 
 
By utilizing higher alloy steel metallurgy, which has been proven to be inherently safer 
against HTHA and sulfidation corrosion, and not relying on cladding followed by manual 
operation of PWHT, the heat exchanger could be made inherently safer. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
Shell and tube heat exchanger failure is a chronic problem in the process industries. Lack 
of risk assessment and inherently safer design considerations during the early stages of design is 
one of the primary causes behind the frequent and repetitive failure of heat exchangers. While 
there is few pioneered safety indices developed for inherent safety assessment of process streams 
based on the operating conditions and physical/chemical properties of the process chemical, 
there is hardly any focus on the safety assessment of equipment which incorporates operating 
conditions and the interaction between process chemical and selected MOC for the equipment. 
The study included the development of a heat exchanger safety index (HESI) and overall 
safety index for heat exchanger network (HENOSI). HESI includes the mechanical safety factor 
of the equipment by analyzing how appropriate the material is for the selected process chemical 
and operating conditions. The developed index can then be utilized in the proposed framework 
(MISF) which provides systematic approach for evaluating equipment safety in conjunction with 
safety assessment of process streams, once the process route has been selected. 
The developed methodology was applied to the case study of catastrophic rupture of heat 
exchanger at Tesoro, Anacortes refinery and the obtained results indicate that if inherently safer 
principles are applied to metallurgy selection process and necessary focus is provided to possible 
interaction between selected process chemical and material of construction, the safety level of 
heat exchanger can be improved by using inherent safety principles in the early stages of project. 
The proposed framework utilizing the developed safety index and inherent risk assessment 
methods allows for systematic evaluation of safety level of major equipments early on in the 
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project development stage, thereby providing opportunity for implementation of inherent safety 
principles and could help in reduction of mechanical failures of equipment to a large extent. 
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5.2 Future Work 
 Validate the proposed methodology with another case study implementing the developed 
indices and framework in the predesign phase of a project e.g. methyl methacrylate 
process, ammonia synthesis process,  methanol production routes 
 Automate the whole calculation process by creating spreadsheet in MS Excel and linking 
with simulation software like HYSYS, to minimize manual inputs/intervention 
 Increase the database list of heat exchanger failure incident and their root cause and 
include more information in the metallurgy interaction sub index, to make it more robust 
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